[Vol. 100: 825 use to interpret statutes-norms that he suggests will improve the operation of regulatory statutes.
Sunstein uses the book's historical perspective to engage and criticize the work of eminent, but now-departed, members of the legal community. He repeatedly challenges the views of Karl Llewellyn, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry Hart, and others on questions of regulation and interpretation. These scholars might appreciate an opportunity to reply. What follows is a glimpse at some of the letters we might imagine are circulating among this invisible host of readers in response to Sunstein's book. The letters contain the reactions of a jurist (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.),' a legal scholar (Karl Llewellyn),' and a political theorist (Hannah Arendt) 3 to this work. 4 Llewellyn's letters suggest that Sunstein, while writing a book about statutes, unconsciously mimics the common law perspective of an appellate court. 5 Llewellyn remains uncertain how Sunstein's principles for interpreting vague statutory language would operate in future cases, concluding that Sunstein's approach, like the common law method, is more helpful in synthesizing the past than in facing the future. Holmes builds on Llewellyn's observations by arguing that Sunstein does not take proper care to explore the different contributions that Congress, the courts, and the executive branch make to the interpretive enterprise.
Arendt, setting aside all issues concerning interpretation and institutional roles, takes issue with Sunstein's defense of regulation. Arendt commends Sunstein for his attempt to create a realm for politics that transcends individual interests, but criticizes his incomplete vision of regulation. She claims that, while he offers a number of reasons for government to regulate, he offers no method to judge whether various types of collective action will promote or extinguish freedom.
While each of the correspondents criticizes Sunstein for the pivotal questions he leaves unaddressed, all of them clearly admire After the Rights Revolution. Each writer has witnessed the tremendous changes in government in this century traced by Sunstein.
Llewellyn to Arendt
Dear Professor Arendt, I would like to suggest that we read for our next afternoon book discussion the recent effort by Cass Sunstein, the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at our old stomping ground in Chicago. To whet your appetite, I will try my hand at reconstructing his argument here, withholding my criticisms until later.
Sunstein prefaces his argument by quoting me: "Technique without morals is a menace; but morals without technique is a mess." '6 He explores both morality and technique (although more of the latter) by tracing "the rise of social and economic regulation" and its relationship to American constitutional government and statutory interpretation. 7 Sunstein begins with a history of regulation in America, drawing on his earlier work 8 and focusing first on James Madison's republic. In his account, Madison designed a powerful national government because he was convinced that representatives in a larger republic could better insulate themselves from 6. P. xi. 7. Pp. 1, 4, 9-10. the pressure of "factions," or interest groups. 9 National representatives would then be free to engage in the deliberative task of politics. 1 0 Because of the ever-present danger of factions, moreover, Madison linked this "deliberative" vision of representation to a limited government that preserved a broad arena for private ordering. ' Several of the fundamental features of the constitutional structure, including checks and balances and federalism, reflected this effort to limit the realm of government and the effects of faction in government. 12 During the early life of the Republic, the courts maintained limits on governmental activity through common law principles, which gradually "came to be treated as largely neutral and prepolitical." 3 The New Deal transformed these original constitutional arrangements in two respects. 4 First, it called into question all forms of common law ordering. Common law entitlements came to be viewed not as a neutral condition produced through government inaction, but as a product of political choices sustained by government action. 15 New Dealers found the common law inadequate because it failed to protect the disadvantaged and prevented the government from stabilizing the economy. Second, the New Deal shifted power from state governments and the state and federal judiciary to the federal executive.1 6 The federal bureaucracy expanded at a remarkable rate. Separation of powers principles gave way to accommodate an "autonomous" administration thought necessary to respond to the complex responsibilities of modern government.
Sunstein points to the "Rights Revolution" of the 1960's and 70's as the final milestone in the history of the regulatory state. During this time, Congress and the President took bold regulatory initiatives in areas such as discrimination 9. Factions in a larger republic "would be so numerous that they would cancel each other out." Pp. 14-15; see also Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra Madisonian vision of representation). Although sharing some common ground with republicanism, such as a belief in a politics that transcends individual interests, Madison's ideal of representation departs from republican thought in important ways. It downplays citizen participation in government and discounts the importance of education and civic virtue among citizens. Pp. 14-15; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 38-42. 11. Sunstein makes an important qualification, however. The Constitution's attempt to protect life, liberty, and property required the government to "protect citizens from private aggression by the provision and indeed redistribution of security," and therefore went beyond a negative view of government. P. 17. Sunstein does not elaborate on the implications of this view for the various state action requirements in the Constitution.
12. The system of checks and balances (including judicial review) and federalism were both means to divide governmental power and "diminish the risk of tyranny." P. 16. The individual rights stressed in the original document were private property rights. The contracts clause, privileges and immunities clause, and eminent domain clause served similar purposes. Sunstein moves next to his theoretical defense of regulation. 9 He sees the primary challenge to regulation coming from those who argue for minimal government based on notions of liberty: because individuals know their preferences, their choices should remain untouched whenever they do no harm to others.° Sunstein counters with several answers, which I have rearranged somewhat. Each is a more comprehensive critique than the last, and each suggests that regulation can increase social welfare and autonomy.
The first, and most modest, answer to opponents of regulation emphasizes the difficulties of coordinating individual choices and attempts to correct market failure. That is, regulation overcomes the failure of a market to satisfy people's preferences where they need to act together. For instance, regulation of a public good, such as national defense, provides collective protection. Without coercion, nobody would pay for their preferences, hoping instead that others would pay. Regulation perfects the market by helping persons satisfy their existing preferences, without making others worse off.
2 '
A second level of response, which I call the "aspirational" strategy, recognizes that people have complicated preferences. They may act in one way, yet aspire to act differently. A person's behavior as a market actor might diverge from her aspirations as a voter or citizen: she could choose to watch only situation comedies on television and yet prefer that more diverse programs remain available.22 Similarly, a person may choose to commit himself early to a particular course of action, attempting to prevent a shortsighted choice at some later time.2 3 Regulation can translate aspirations such as these into action where the market would not do so.
The most comprehensive answer, which I call the "preference formation" strategy, goes beyond the market's failure to translate existing desires into 
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The Yale Law Journal public policy. In this view, regulation not only helps persons attain their preferences, but also helps improve the process of forming preferences. 24 Preferences are questionable when they are based on inadequate information or on opportunities limited by current legal rules, such as opportunities for interaction between racial groups under laws tolerating segregation. 2 Hence, regulation might provide better information to those forming preferences, or it might promote diversity of experience to enable people to scrutinize critically their current preferences and perhaps form new ones. 2 7 Sunstein translates this theoretical case for regulation into a more detailed taxonomy of the purposes of regulatory statutes. He creates categories of purposes as a reminder that we must evaluate each regulatory scheme on its own terms, since different programs have different aims. Sunstein lists eight purposes for regulation:' (1) remedying market failure, (2) redistributing wealth, (3) carrying out collective desires and precommitment strategies, (4) creating diversity of experience and opportunities for preference formation, 29 (5) ending social subordination, (6) surmounting preferences endogenous to the legal and social order, 30 (7) protecting future generations from irreversible decisions, and (8) transferring income to interest groups. This list, it seems to me, is a bit unwieldy, for any given regulatory statute might serve several of these purposes. This is true, not only because statutes have multiple objectives, but also because the classifications themselves contain overlapping categories. 32 The overlapping quality is troubling because Sunstein uses the categories to distinguish different forms of regulation, invoking different criteria to evaluate different categories of regulation. In addition, some categories present complex rationales for regulation because they combine the three regulatory strategies already described: coordinating preferences, following complex preferences, and shaping preferences. For instance, regulation attempting to eliminate social subordination seeks to reshape the preference for discrimination 33 The argument up to this point left me convinced that there are many reasons to regulate. Sunstein also provides, however, an equally dizzying set of reasons not to regulate . 3 Either at the time of design or at the time of implementation, government actors may ignore or forget two likely sources of regulatory failure: (1) preferences blocked by regulation will likely reappear in other, more destructive forms, and (2) regulators have incentives to favor some private interests over others (the "capture" argument). These forces frequently produce "paradoxes of regulation," which "bring about results precisely opposite to those that are intended. 36 Regulatory failures are commonly the result of interest-group influence, as occurred, for example, when producers of dirty, high-sulphur coal convinced Congress to pursue an antipollution strategy that disadvantaged the clean-coal producers. 37 Sunstein indicts regulatory statutes for failing to remain flexible about the best means to a desired outcome. The use of an uncompromising rhetoric of "rights" contributes to this lack of flexibility.
3
In Sunstein's view, the Framers of the Constitution created a structure that responds well to many possible regulatory failures. The potential problem of interest group dominance was addressed by a system of checks and balances. 39 The effort to ensure both deliberation and accountability in government also improves many regulatory schemes. 4 According to Sunstein, federalism allows different states the flexibility necessary to respond to differing conditions "blame the victim." Antidiscrimination laws attempt to change these attitudes. Pp. 61-64, 66-67.
34. Another category of regulation that combines the three strategies is labeled 'Irreversibility, Future generations, Animals, and Nature." Pp. 67-69. Some choices may be sensible for an individual making a choice today, but their consequences (such as environmental degradation) will be felt by others in the future and will be difficult to reverse. Regulation in this setting responds to an externality, costs falling on those not responsible for the decision. Pp. 54-55. It also might seek to change preferences formed with inadequate information, or to carry out aspirations of protecting the interests of future generations or other species. 
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throughout the country." The unitary executive envisioned by the Constitution would give the President power to coordinate policy and promote accountability. 42 Restoring these constitutional understandings to the status they lost during the New Deal would, in his view, help prevent regulatory failure. 43 The final half of the book deals with the contribution of courts to a successful regulatory program." In particular, Sunstein outlines an approach to interpreting statutes, which requires that the courts "sympathetic[ally] engage" 45 the statute and draw upon "background" understandings that recognize the typical failures of regulation. 4 Sunstein stakes out his own theory of statutory interpretation through a process of elimination, attempting to catalog and avoid the shortcomings of other approaches. He begins with the various "agency" theories, which view courts as agents carrying out the will of the legislature. 4 7 Sunstein finds each such approach to be inadequate. An interpreter, he says, must derive the meaning of words from background understandings drawn from the cultural context." Usually the norms are widely shared and noncontroversial, but at times the choice of norms will be highly controversial. The need for background norms will be most striking where a statute is silent, addresses a situation ambiguously, or delegates lawmaking power to the courts. 49 The need will also be present where the statute seems to be overinclusive, underinclusive, 43. Sunstein closes Chapter 3 by tying various regulatory failures to the seven forms of regulation they afflict most often. For instance, statutes that "promote public-spirited redistribution" often have a "weak understanding of the ways in which regulation interacts with the market." P. 103. Statutes that "respond to a short-term public outcry" tend to interfere excessively in the market. P. 105. Finally, regulatory statutes "fail quite generally as a result of the absence of political accountability or political deliberation, changed circumstances or obsolescence, a misunderstanding of systemic effects, and lack of coordination." P. 105. He cautions that "[all of these generalizations are of course subject to exceptions." P. 105.
44. The Harvard Law Review published a revised version of the manuscript of these three chapters in December 1989, several months before publication of the book. Sunstein 47. One manifestation of the agency view is "textualism," which calls on courts to give meaning to the statutory text without reference to any "outside" sources such as current conditions or the statute's history or larger purposes. Pp. 113-22. Other agency theories include the structural approach, which resolves interpretive difficulties by choosing the meaning that creates the best fit among various statutory provisions, pp. 122-23, and the purposive approach, which looks to the legislature's underlying intent regarding the matter at hand. Pp. 123-33.
The agency approach, in Sunstein's view, contains an important truth: it recognizes the democratic pedigree of the legislature and, particularly, of the statutory language it chooses. The legislature enacts words, not a history or an intent. [Vol. 100: 825 or outdated, and therefore produces absurd results. 5 " Where the statutory language does not clearly resolve the issue, no constitutional consideration prevents a court from reaching an alternative, arguably better, rule based on background understandings. 51 An interpretive theory one step removed from the agency theories looks to the overriding "purpose" of the legislation, rather than to the legislative intent on a specific issue. Sunstein places me in this category, along with Ronald Dworkin, and Legal Process scholars Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. 52 Each of us has urged courts to seek out the most sensible purpose of the statute, and to construe it in a way that best furthers that purpose. 53 Sunstein, however, finds that advice too open-ended in a society where there is likely to be conflict over what is "reasonable" or most "sensible." ' ' While I take issue with this criticism, I will press ahead with Sunstein's argument for now.
Several interpretive theories rely on extratextual norms that are more specific than "reasonableness," but Sunstein finds them wanting for other reasons. Under the public choice theory, statutes are nothing more than incoherent compromises or "deals" between interest groups and legislators. The role of the courts therefore is simply to enforce legislative deals rather than to fathom the "purpose" of a compromise outcome. 55 While Sunstein accepts the descriptive force of public choice theory for some (but not all) statutes, he rejects the claim that judges should enforce deals. 5 6 A more attractive legal order will be possible only if judges push statutes in directions that further broad public purposes rather than interest group preferences. 104-10 (1975) . In response to both, Sunstein maintains that interpreters consciously choose their strategies, and that choice is in many cases predictable. The fact that the interpretive strategies employ value choices or community practices does not mean there is no basis for evaluating different approaches. Pp. 144-47.
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The Yale Law Journal After Sunstein completes his target practice, the only approach left standing depends on "canons of construction." Canons of construction provide instructions to courts and others facing recurring difficulties interpreting statutes. He feels that I destroyed the credibility of canons forty years ago when I mischievously paired canons suggesting one outcome with other canons suggesting the opposite outcome. 5 8 Although I have discussed these canons in half-jesting mockery, Sunstein finds them useful as tools to orient readers within a text or to improve lawmaking and institutional functions. 5 9
Sunstein's distinctive contributions to statutory interpretation are, first, to retrieve statutory canons from the grave I dug for them, and second, to insist that the choice of canons reflects fundamental regulatory choices and experiences of the last half century. These background norms do not supplant textual and contextual aspects of the specific statute, but supplement them when they inevitably produce ambiguity. 6 " Sunstein groups his sizeable arsenal of canons into three categories: canons that further constitutional norms that otherwise go underenforced, 6 1 canons that counteract the most typical institutional failures of government bodies, 62 and canons that counteract the most common failures of regulatory statutes. 63 With regard to the first category, Sunstein urges courts to read statutes in ways that will promote political deliberation and to construe narrowly interest group deals. They should limit delegation of authority to agencies and attempt to heighten the political accountability of regulators. Further, they should insist on clarity to uphold the rule of law and to give notice to the public; they should read ambiguous language to protect disadvantaged groups, as well as property and contract rights; and they should interpret narrowly any statute purporting to limit rights to hearings or to judicial review. Finally, courts should read statutes to preserve the relative power of states within the federal system.' 4 An equally large group of canons attempts to respond to the regulatory problems Sunstein identified earlier. This group includes the suggestions that courts read statutes to favor diffuse regulatory beneficiaries, coordinate policies in related areas of regulation, account for technology or social change that has made a statute obsolete, account for systemic effects of regulation, keep regulatory benefits proportional to regulatory costs, and avoid irrationality. 65 His long checklist of possible regulatory failures guarantees that the list of responsive canons will be equally long. Mindful of possible conflict, Sunstein [Vol. 100: 825 orders them by making those canons which enhance political accountability and deliberation the two most important, followed next by other constitutionally inspired canons and those canons calling for proportionality of benefits and costs.
66
After applying the canons to a series of illustrative cases, 67 Sunstein closes with an observation about the persistence of interpretive techniques that reflect pre-New Deal understandings of government regulation. Many issues of statutory construction "amount to a confrontation between regulatory regimes and the pre-New Deal pre.mises they appear to repudiate." 68 The New Deal attack on common law private ordering, adopted by the democratic branches, recognizes that regulation can promote welfare and distributive justice. Such disputes between past and present are best resolved by synthesizing the best of the prior constitutional systems within a framework hospitable to modem regulation.
While I realize you remain terribly busy and may not take much interest in lawyers' squabbles over interpretation, I am quite sure you will have a response to Sunstein's ideas. His view of regulation, which he distinguishes at several points from totalitarianism, 6 9 seems to have some bearing on your long-standing concern with public action and the private sphere. 70 It would interest me to hear your reactions.
Sincerely yours, Karl N. Llewellyn
Holmes to Llewellyn
My dear Llewellyn, Thank you for recommending Sunstein's book. It is indeed an important and ambitious work, all the more so because it addresses a topic-statutory interpretation-that has provoked a feeding frenzy among legal scholars today. I would suggest that Sunstein, like many others writing about interpretation, seems preoccupied with the number of considerations an interpreter should consider. Unfortunately, he appears less concerned with who interprets the statute or with the best method to handle conflicting interpretive considerations. 
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The current debate over interpretation, like similar debates in the past, centers on enumerating the considerations an interpreter should include or exclude. The arresting aspect of the current debate is its linear quality. Most of the commentators move along a familiar path, beginning with the statute's language and including more and more considerations as they proceed through the interpretive enterprise, until they reach a point where they feel it is proper to exclude a consideration. Those who stop at a given point tend to agree that everything else further down the path should be excluded. They generally include the same considerations as other theorists who have reached the same point on the path. Hence, disagreements all focus on the proper length of the interpretive path. 71 This underlying consensus sets the current debate apart from earlier discussions about interpretation.
Those who rely on statutory text and structure alone-such as Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook 7 2 --make the most ambitious case for exclusion. They would exclude any evidence of legislative "intent" or "purpose" because it has no force of law and because it is so easily manipulated. Instead, they would interpret the statute by looking only to its structure and to the plain meaning of its words. Current theorists of statutory construction also put me in this category, although I would dispute this placement. 73 Others concede that the text is relevant, but move beyond the text to formal historical evidence of the legislature's intent regarding the statute in question. They would exclude, however, other evidence of legislative preference and the views of 135, 143 (1905) (resorting to "general purpose" of statutory language to ascertain its common usage).
Holmes' "objective" view of legislative intent makes his approach a variation on the plain meaning approach. Thus, he does not fall squarely into the modem linear pattern of interpretation theories, since he allows courts to look to the statutory language, the history of its passage, and other contemporary evidence, all the while maintaining the irrelevance of legislative intent as such. See also Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 44 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1931) (advice for those drafting and codifying statutes).
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The Regulatory State those outside the legislature. 74 The next most inclusive step would allow evidence of the enacting legislature's general purpose in passing the statute, by identifying the problems facing the legislature when it took action.' Beyond that, one might derive the legislature's intent or purpose from any source, including, for example, an historical survey of the era. 6 Further steps along the path of inclusion might encompass the views of subsequent legislatures. Such views would be determined by looking to statutes on related topics and other forms of legislative activity. 77 One might even use significant social changes as evidence of the views of subsequent legislatures. 78 Each of these approaches would attempt to discover and replicate a legislative perspective on the statute.
Others would go further to include considerations not even loosely attributable to the legislature, past or present. For example, the interpreter might look to the views of the agency administering the statute. 79 Or, a judge might go beyond agency views, and decide for herself the desirability of particular consequences, measured by criteria such as "efficiency," "justice," or "politics. . Some interpretive decisionmakers argue that interpreters should promote the overall "coherence" of the law. This argument might be taken to mean that a statute should be read in light of all other statutory enactments, so that the interpreter fulfills the "convictions" selected by legislators. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 327-30. On the other hand, such a notion of "coherence" may call for a decisionmaker to promote a more general notion of logical and philosophical coherence.
78. This appears to be the position of William Eskridge, who has argued in a series of law review articles that interpreters should employ a "dynamic" approach to statutory interpretation, reshaping old statutes to promote current policy. Eskridge focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on legislative activity as the measure of current policy. Eskridge 80. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 20-22, 46-54 (judges reformulate statutory purpose to be consistent with broad prevailing norms); Moore, supra note 47, at 338-58; see also Macey, supra note 57, at 226-27 (interpreter should promote efficiency). Professor Moore's views appear to be an exception to the general trend of including all sources of legislative intent before arriving at nonlegislative "natural law" considerations. He would consider only the text and the interpreter's views on justice. Moore, supra note 47, at 338-Sunstein would allow judges to consider the statutory text, along with evidence of the enacting or subsequent legislature's intentions or purposes. 8 1 Furthermore, he would draw on regulatory experience to ask whether a particular interpretation of a statute would accomplish one of the regulatory purposes or fall prey to a typical regulatory failure. 2 In other words, he asks judges to save the legislature from itself.
Although he travels a long way down the inclusive path, Sunstein does exclude some considerations from interpretation. He forbids judges to consider either purely personal visions of sound policy or perspectives already repudiated by the democratic branches. 8 3 Others have maintained that such an exclusion is undesirable or impossible. 84 Living in a day dominated by common law courts, I never developed fully my thoughts about statutes, though I did make a few observations." 5 It now occurs to me that Sunstein's decision to include what he does in the interpretive enterprise is consistent in several respects with my own views on statutes and the common law process.
Sunstein shares my sense that an interpreter has no choice but to place statutory language in some larger context in order to ascertain its meaning: "A word is not a crystal." 86 Sunstein also appears to build on my insistence that law evolves to reflect the needs and values of society as they change over time. 87 An interpreter should handle silence and uncertainty in a way that best reflects the general outlook of the day, as expressed by the enacting legislature. In other words, the background for interpreting statutes should evolve just as statutes evolve. My contemporary, Roscoe Pound, also insisted that interpreters should use statutes themselves as sources of analogies in interpreting statutory provisions, rather than drawing on common law doctrine at odds with the statutory structure. 88 58.
81 Despite my agreement with Sunstein, I recognize some difficult side-effects of his decision to include so many considerations in the interpretive venture. Doing so leaves him the devilish task of describing the interaction and relative importance of the factors. He says that a statutory text will determine many cases, and that the legislative history will determine many others, 9 yet he also maintains that a judge in some cases (not just those where text and legislative history provide no guidance) should take account of regulatory purposes and failures. 90 This indeterminacy in Sunstein's interpretive method raises the same sorts of problems ,ou highlighted when you exposed the arbitrariness of selecting among competing canons of construction. 91 Perhaps you would care to comment.
Yours ever, O.W. Holmes

Llewellyn to Holmes
Dear Justice Holmes, 9 2 I agree that the difficulty you noted with Sunstein's interpretive method is nothing new. If everything counts, one's ability to predict an interpretive outcome rests on how much a given factor counts. This is precisely the problem that led me to criticize the canons of construction.
The traditional canons of construction contained a bit of everything. They instructed courts to fill in the meaning of statutes by following conventions based on likely legislative desires, or typical uses of language. 93 I pointed out what should have been obvious: the canons often gave conflicting advice, and the determinative choice among the canons was not compelled by any visible or logical reason. I am now willing to concede that this criticism was overstated, since the canons do not conflict in every conceivable case. 94 Still, my proposed response to the difficulty with canons was decidedly understated:
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 533, 539-44 (1983). But the scope of what is covered by the literal terms of a statute might be narrower than the parties are likely to admit, and it would perhaps be unreasonable to expect a stable interpretive background for resolving ambiguity. Those negotiating over language in a statute, if they pay attention to such things, must understand that statutory ambiguity presents a risk that later interpreters will reject the drafters' view of the disputed language. 
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The Yale Law Journal interpreters should not pretend that canons control outcomes, but should instead seek an outcome that produces sensible consequences just as a common law court might.
I have never denied that the right canon, chosen in the right case, could lead to sound results. Sunstein proposes many appealing canons that could improve the operation of statutes when interpreters choose and use them wisely. But I still insist that the canons of my day were not self-selecting and therefore not self-executing, and neither are Sunstein's; it is all in the selection.
Sunstein provides little direction in choosing the appropriate background norm. He prioritizes his canons, telling interpreters to rely first on constitutional norms. 95 But this does not offer much guidance, since "accountability" and "deliberation" are the two overarching constitutional values Sunstein invokes. Even if one could say what these amorphous values might mean for a given statute, accountability and deliberation more often than not point in different directions. Recall that Madison favored national representatives precisely because they were less immediately accountable to the voters and therefore more capable of deliberation. 9 6 Sunstein also supplies principles of "harmonization" to resolve potential conflicts among background norms. For instance, he proposes that a minor violation of a background norm will give a court only a weak reason to construe a statute in a particular direction. 97 However, this principle of harmonization is liable to create more uncertainty than it will resolve. It means that even the clearest prioritizing of norms will settle nothing if the most important norm is violated the least. Perhaps Sunstein's most important contribution to the use of canons is his insistence that some norms are off limits. He argues that interpretive norms must be consistent with the aspirations and experience of the regulatory state rather than repudiated policies of private ordering. This broad appeal to consistency might reduce the number of conflicts between norms. 98 But given the bewildering variety of regulatory purposes and failures that Sunstein covers, conflicts among canons---even those consistent with regulatory experience-will likely be the rule and not the exception.
Sunstein therefore fails to meet my critique of canons, which focuses on the choice among canons, however wise each of the individual canons might be. In the end, Sunstein invokes "practical reason" to explain how a judge will handle multiple interpretive norms, 99 which is similar to my "hopelessly banal" advice to make "sense" of our law as a whole." 10 [Vol. 100: 825 practical reason-the conviction that one can know the correct action to take in a given situation without a theory to explain why it is correct 10 1 --is probably the closest we come to describing or prescribing a process of statutory interpretation. Holmes, you outlined long ago the virtues of a pragmatic legal method that depends primarily on moral intuition as applied to a specific situation."° I have called this method the "situation sense" of judges. " Statutory interpretation therefore resembles the vision that you and I share of the common law method." The common law, at its best, recognizes that existing legal principles do not compel outcomes; they only serve as a starting place for extending any given principle to reach the intuitively just outcome in new cases. 105 The very breadth of Sunstein's book may have obscured one of the only plausible ways of refining the practical reason, or common law, approach to statutes. For particular statutory sub-areas, such as environmental statutes or statutes dealing with commercial sales transactions,"° one can imagine that interpreters could reach a consensus on regulatory purposes and typical failures. Within the sub-area, interpreters could develop more predictable and desirable interpretive practices, but these practices would not offer much guidance for those interpreting statutes outside the sub-area. 1 0 7 Sunstein is more effective, I think, in answering other Legal Realist criticisms of statutory canons. Max Radin and others criticized canons because the canons poorly reflected the typical uses of language and the likely intentions 
The Yale Law Journal of a legislature.' 0 8 In other words, these critics directly questioned the canons' content, rather than their propensity towards inconsistency. Sunstein updates some canons to make them reflect the experiences and aspirations of the administrative state. Thus, Sunstein has demonstrated that attention to the content of interpretive norms can improve interpretation, even where it does not make the interpretive method more determinate°9 While this may only prevent the most foolish and anachronistic readings of statutes, it remains quite an achievement.
Holmes to Llewellyn
My dear Llewellyn, I agree with your concluding observation that Sunstein's attention to the content of canons is a worthwhile effort. But that insight only brings us to more important questions. Who will develop and use these canons? Sunstein pays virtually no attention to the process of developing background norms. The generation of scholars who followed you and Radin---the Legal Process scholars-would find this omission perplexing. Indeed, they might find it distressing that you still do not turn naturally to the question of institutional competence, which is, after all, a way to control who will wield the unconstrained power at work in the law that you have identified.
Legal Process scholars concluded that if substantive principles of law could not constrain the outcome of a decision, perhaps it was more important to focus on the institutional pressures on the decisionmaker than on the arguments he or she would hear." 0 To that end, they developed more fully my position that judges should leave decisions about certain types of issues to others who are more directly accountable."' Legal Process scholars might join me in asking why Sunstein pins his hopes for developing and using proper background norms on judges rather than other interpreters. 1 Sunstein's interpretive model deviates from mine when he says that a judge must minimize the impact of legislative folly. Sunstein contrasts this position to one I have expressed elsewhere: "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job." 113 In many cases, this difference in our approaches might not change the outcomes. I would not assert that judges must enhance the perverse side-effects of a statute if Congress did not contemplate such side-effects. If there is a reading of a statute that a reasonable person would likely adopt to avoid foolish consequences, I might be willing to attribute that reading to the legislature."' But I would only do so where it is quite likely that the enacting legislature would want me to do so.' Sunstein seems to allow the judge to draw more generally on regulatory experience, even to contradict certain legislative choices.
Judges must interpret statutes using something more than the explicit instructions of Congress, but they must do so with a keen sense of their limited legitimacy and limited abilities.' 16 The difficulty of judicial legitimacy, a product of the unaccountability of judges, is a familiar topic and I need not review it with you."
7 Allow me to focus instead on limited judicial abilities, 116. Sunstein briefly deals with the possibility that judges, because of the undemocratic nature of their office, should rely on legislative judgments as much as possible. Pp. 133-37. He submits, however, that this will only be possible in the small group of cases in which judges can ascertain what the legislature wanted by using noncontroversial interpretive principles. In other cases, he says, the interpreter will need to select proper interpretive principles to reach sound results. Sunstein's answer points to the advantages of some interpreter resorting to considerations beyond legislative purpose and intent, but he provides an inadequate reason to choose courts as the primary interpreters.
117. Justice Holmes is perhaps wise to emphasize judicial abilities rather than judicial legitimacy, since there are several factors that argue for the legitimacy of certain "value" choices by judges. To begin with, legislatures are less democratically accountable than is generally acknowledged. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043, 1080-87 (1988). In addition, the sharp distinction between "reasoned" exercises of judgment and exercises of political "will" is perhaps philosophically and psychologically naive. Popkin, supra note 78, at 546-52.
Sunstein mitigates the legitimacy problem in a couple of ways. First, his prescription for political deliberation and accountability mimics the "process" approach of John Hart Ely, who suggested that judicial review should aim to improve the democratic character of the political process. This is particularly true for Sunstein where judges are employing the constitutionally based background norms. Pp. 165-66; J. ELY, which present even greater problems for Sunstein's reliance on judges as interpreters.
For Sunstein, it is critical that the interpreter develop and use a set of background norms based on a sophisticated general view of regulation. But the very diversity of adjudication makes it unlikely that judges will develop such a coherent general view. Judges will hear arguments by advocates regarding a particular application of a particular statute; an overarching vision of regulation is unlikely to emerge from the fray. Even if this were a possibility for one judge, there are over one thousand federal judges (appointed by different Presidents) and thousands of state judges interpreting regulatory statutes; 118 the chances that such a group would develop a set of norms resembling Sunstein's are remote in the extreme.
Moreover, Sunstein calls on interpreters to be alert to the systemic consequences of different forms of regulation and to anticipate hidden problems that escaped the attention of the legislature." 9 Yet an inability to see all the diverse effects of a decision, to look beyond the frame of the controversy that presents itself, is perhaps the greatest weakness of a judicial decision. 2°S unstein may be appealing to the interpreters who are least able to see the subtle side-effects of regulation.
If Sunstein had looked to administrative agencies rather than courts, these troubles would have tapered off. To begin with, an agency answers to elected officials and can avoid some of the difficulties of judicial legitimacy. It can make the "value-laden" choice" 2 of an interpretive norm without such serious questions concerning its authority to do so. 122 An agency could also choose a single set of interpretive norms without the conflicts that would inevitably develop as diverse courts confront the issue. Its perspective on the operation of an entire regulatory program, rather than on one focused, disputed area at the moment, makes the agency better able to anticipate DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75, 102-03 (1981) . Second, Sunstein's call for a"sympathetic engagement" with regulatory principles by courts grows out of the need to respect the decisions of the most democratic branches. Pp. 71-73. 122. The legitimacy of agency policymaking is grounded both in the delegation of policymaking power from the legislature and in the indirect electoral accountability of administrators through the chief executive. Both sources of policymaking legitimacy for agencies axe problematic, since (I) there must be some indication that Congress actually chose to give authority to the agency, and (2) the executive's legitimate role is limited to administration and not legislating. Nevertheless, agencies have a claim to policymaking legitimacy that is marginally stronger than the claim of judges. First, it is fair to guess that Congress authorizes agency policymaking more frequently than judicial policymaking. Second, the tasks of administration inevitably encompass some policy decisions.
[Vol. 100: 825 side-effects that others may have missed.la And the agency's sustained attention to its regulatory mission will give it the best grasp of pertinent regulatory purposes and the history of past failures. At the same time, it would be familiar with concrete applications of the statute, just as a court would." 2 ' In short, Sunstein has created a powerful model for improving agency interpretation of statutes that employs traditional agency strengths. The trouble lies in the fact that he addresses it first to courts.
While Sunstein recognizes that agencies also interpret statutes," z he believes they should do so in the shadow of courts. He rejects any general preference for agency interpretation over judicial, and consigns agency interpretation to the realm of "mixed questions" of law and fact. 126 This leaves most issues to the courts, since the "pure" questions of law they decide will include the choice of appropriate background norms.
Sunstein's preference for courts over agencies is largely a response to the problem of agency capture by private interests. This is a genuine concern and makes the choice of interpretive institutions all the more difficult. Yet it is not clear how often agency "capture" actually occurs, or actually disables agency interpretations of statutes. 1 2 7 By contrast, the limited perspective judges have seems far more commonplace.
Agencies are not the only alternative to courts as the place for generating interpretive norms. Sunstein also should acknowledge the legislature as a source of interpretive norms. Perhaps Sunstein's set of "canons" might take the shape of an "interpretation statute" of the sort found in the United States Code and many state codes. 1 18 In such.a construction statute, the legislature decides for itself the approach that interpreters should take in fleshing out the meaning of regulatory statutes. While the construction statute will itself require some judicial or agency interpretation,' 2 9 it would nevertheless further the process of developing a set of background norms congenial to the regulatory state. 124. Sunstein lists this as a significant interpretive advantage of courts: "Above all, the focus on the particular circumstances enables judges to deal with applications that any legislature, no matter how farsighted, could not conceivably have envisaged ....
In this respect, judicial decision of individual cases, allowing an emphasis on the particular context, contains significant advantages for interpretation." Pp. 135 Sunstein is certainly not alone in his court-centered approach to interpretation. With few exceptions, general discussions of interpretation spotlight judges. Most theorists have not considered why judges, as opposed to agencies, should remain at the center of analysis and debate. 1 30 But given the satisfying fit between Sunstein's approach and agency talents, this book may present an opportunity to bring agency interpreters more completely into the discussion.
Aff'ly yours, Holmes
Arendt to LIewellyn
Dear Professor Llewellyn, Your correspondence with Justice Holmes has stimulated my thinking about Professor Sunstein's views on regulation. You and Justice Holmes, being lawyers, seem terribly concerned with which institutions have interpretive decisionmaking authority, and which method they employ to reach their decisions. However, these methodological and institutional analyses of the interpretive process are pointless if the statutes involved begin with an improper view of regulation and the place of government.
While I find many of Sunstein's views on regulation appealing, I believe his book offers a dangerously incomplete statement of when and how it is appropriate for government to regulate human affairs. While it explains the incredible variety of benefits that citizens might hope for when they regulate, it offers a uni-dimensional account of the dangers of regulation, focusing only on the danger of economic inefficiency. The book does not explore other dangers to freedom and consequently does not develop ways to guard against them.
As I have emphasized in my writing, the best government is one that preserves a public space for freedom.'
13 As in the Greek polis, we must create conditions for citizens to make new beginnings and inspire others to action through their words and deeds. 32 Sunstein's vision of regulation, however, does have two features I admire greatly. First, Sunstein is right to reject the minimalist state. As I have stated before, freedom of action is only possible where citizens participate together in a political order. 13 A society that merely prevents its members from injuring one another does little to promote the human condition. Indeed, the threat of totalitarianism does not arise merely from destructive collective action; it also arises where there is no forum for the exercise of collective freedom. The alienation of individuals who do not act together as a plurality paves the way for totalitarianism. Secondly, Sunstein makes an admirable effort to distinguish citizens from market actors. He acknowledges that people may have certain aspirations for themselves or their society, even though they may fail to act on those aspirations when behaving as consumers. He claims that his view of regulation encompasses several different visions of the political order, 137 including those that emphasize freedom: Sunstein makes the distinction between citizens and market actors to establish the possibility of "deliberative" government, where outcomes are not necessarily determined by the economic needs of individuals. Rather, deliberative government is independent of preexisting economic interests, and citizens can persuade one another to take principled action regardless of their usual behavior as consumers.
The distinction Sunstein makes between citizens and consumers, together with his portrayal of deliberative government, coincides with my vision of a "public space" for freedom. I share his high opinion of the American Revolution, which brought the people together for discussion and action in a forum where economic interests did not predominate." 9 While Sunstein affirms the possibility of a public space transcending private interests, pointing out a possibility is not enough to ensure freedom. He offers no assurance that representatives will protect free political action within the regulatory context. Indeed, he rejects several promising means of promoting and preserving freedom that I have proposed elsewhere.
First, Sunstein refuses to exclude economic issues from the public forum. While I recognize that my position runs counter to most modem political theory," 1 ' I have asserted that we should exclude economic considerations from the realm of action, 14 t because citizens have no freedom to act independent of their economic interests. 42 Their need for food and other necessities forces them to engage in certain predictable behavior, and perhaps to use coercion and violence to obtain what they need. 143 There is no place in the political realm for the predictable or for coercion and violence.'" Thus, citizens must meet their economic needs before they engage in politics." On this score, I believe Justice Holmes would side with me against Sunstein. Holmes maintained privately that ownership of property was a destructive issue whenever it arose in politics."
Despite the danger to freedom that I perceive in public resolution of economic issues, Sunstein places such economic matters at the center of the regulatory stage. The majority of the regulatory purposes he discusses involve the maximization of social wealth or the distribution of wealth. He shares with Marx and the modern Western political tradition an insistence that economics should be the focal point of public action.
We would, in my opinion, be safer from totalitarianism if we were to exclude economic matters from the public realm altogether. 47 Alternatively, we might tolerate economic regulation, but maintain the primacy of noneconomic issues and the inviolability of public space for discussion. 1 4 Sunstein, however, does not explore this alternative.
Another preventative measure that Sunstein neglects, and one more in keeping with modern politics than the measures I have just mentioned, is participation. By participating directly in politics, citizens strengthen bonds with one another and exercise the freedom that is the antithesis of totalitarianism. 149 Direct citizen participation was a recurrent element of the republican influence in the nation's founding. 5 Sunstein, however, is unenthusiastic about participation. He asserts that direct participation in government is unworkable, and therefore turns to representative government.1 5 ' While calling for greater government accountability to voters, he also praises representation because of its insulation from the desires of citizens. Sunstein, though sympathetic with some aspects of republicanism, settles on a truncated version of this tradition.
I have stated that voting is not an adequate form of participation, because the value of political power comes not from its possession but from its regular exercise.1 52 If Sunstein could devote more effort to creating possibilities for direct citizen participation in the affairs of government, there might be reason to believe that the citizens would use forms of regulation that carry out collective aspirations, a possibility Sunstein only raises. The isolation and alienation that can bring on totalitarianism might not take hold.
Perhaps my reservations about Sunstein's regulatory theory are related to your criticism of his account of interpretation. He generates a flurry of conflicting rationales for regulation, just as he offers competing methods of interpretation. In both cases, he sidesteps the most challenging question, how to mediate between these seemingly incongruent rationales and methods of interpretation.
In sum, Sunstein offers many possible activities for government, but does not address the twin dangers I have discussed: on the one hand, citizens could fail to engage in public activities and forfeit the realm for political action, while on the other hand, regulatory activities might themselves destroy freedom. We need more than a description of possible regulatory purposes. We need some careful thought about when these purposes provide too little or too much regulatory activity to be consistent with freedom.
Sunstein does begin the related task of finding the best means to a given end. His reasons not to regulate all address the possible inefficiency of regulation as a tool to maximize social wealth. This effort to improve means is important, but it cannot replace the need to choose proper regulatory ends, which will prevent destructive regulation. Our efforts should focus on encouraging citizens to aspire to words and deeds beyond those dictated by economic necessity.
Sincerely, Hannah Arendt
Llewellyn to Arendt
Dear Professor Arendt, Thank you for passing along your iconoclastic views regarding Sunstein's account of regulation. While you may be right to hope for politics transcending economic interests, it is unlikely that economics will remain outside the political realm in the United States. As you recognize, free political action is not possible if one is preoccupied with feeding oneself. Many citizens therefore face a paradox: they must remain preoccupied with necessity until the polity is reorganized. That can only happen through politics, so they bring issues of necessity into the public forum.) 5 3 Assuming this is true, it raises another critique of Sunstein's account of regulation. You argued that he dwells unnecessarily on economic regulation without acknowledging its destructive effects apart from wealth maximization and distribution. But it is worth asking whether Sunstein's regulatory principles will offer any real guidance to those who are concerned only with such economic issues. Will he overwhelm them with possibilities?
The sheer number of potential forms of regulation makes it difficult to apply Sunstein's regulatory principles, just as I noted in my letter to Holmes that it is difficult to apply his interpretive principles. As Sunstein puts it, "[t]he appropriate nature and scope of regulation cannot be decided on without knowing a good deal about the facts, including above all the practical effects of various regulatory strategies."" l Sunstein's approach to regulation simply underscores the importance of further study of specific forms of regulation, in an effort to learn "a great deal about the facts." A regulator choosing appropri- 
